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NATIONAL IDENTITY AND MARKET FREEDOMS AFTER 
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Summary: The aim of this paper is to explore the balance between 
market freedoms and national regulatory autonomy following the en-
try into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, particularly in the light of the 
rephrased national identity guarantee under Article 4(2) TEU. The pa-
per will discuss whether the newly established obligation of the Euro-
pean Union to respect the national identities of its Member States has 
any consequences in the case law of the European Court of Justice. 
Arguably, defining the proper scope of application of the national iden-
tity guarantee is relevant to the application of EU law, since it disturbs 
the previously established balance between European and national 
law. If defined too broadly, it can undermine the uniform application 
and effectiveness of EU law. If defined too narrowly, it would be de-
void of any useful effect.
With this objective in mind, I will first clarify the concept of national 
identity and, more specifically, national constitutional identity. Second, 
I will discuss the case law of the ECJ preceding the entry into force of 
the Treaty of Lisbon. In this part, I will suggest that the development 
of national identity law before the Treaty of Lisbon went through three 
evolutionary phases: a phase of early and implicit national identity law; 
a phase in which the ECJ developed the margin of discretion doctrine; 
and a phase in which the ECJ started to differentiate national consti-
tutional rules and accord them different levels of scrutiny. In the third 
part, I will explore whether there have been significant developments in 
the national identity case law of the ECJ after the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Lisbon, and suggest that the general approach of the ECJ has 
not significantly changed. I will also argue that the main developments 
related to Article 4(2) TEU have not taken place before the ECJ, but in 
national arenas, notably in France and Germany. In the fourth and final 
part, I will return to the issue of the differentiation of national identity 
claims and conclude that one category is understood by the ECJ as an 
ordinary justification of national measures restricting one of the market 
freedoms, while the other category of claims prompts the ECJ to defer to 
national authorities.
∗ University of Zagreb, Faculty of Law.
12 Siniša Rodin: National Identity and Market Freedoms after the Treaty of Lisbon
1. Introduction
The aim of this paper is to explore the balance between market free-
doms and national regulatory autonomy following the entry into force of 
the Treaty of Lisbon, particularly in the light of the rephrased national 
identity guarantee under Article 4(2) TEU. The paper will discuss whether 
the newly established obligation of the European Union to respect the 
national identities of its Member States has any consequences in the 
case law of the European Court of Justice. Arguably, defining the proper 
scope of application of the national identity guarantee is relevant to the 
application of EU law, since it disturbs the previously established ba-
lance between European and national law. If defined too broadly, it can 
undermine the uniform application and effectiveness of EU law. If defined 
too narrowly, it would be devoid of any useful effect.
With this objective in mind, I will first clarify the concept of national 
identity and, more specifically, national constitutional identity. Second, 
I will discuss the case law of the ECJ preceding the entry into force of 
the Treaty of Lisbon. In this part, I will suggest that the development 
of national identity law before the Treaty of Lisbon went through three 
evolutionary phases: a phase of early and implicit national identity law; 
a phase in which the ECJ developed the margin of discretion doctrine; 
and a phase in which the ECJ started to differentiate national consti-
tutional rules and accord them different levels of scrutiny. In the third 
part, I will explore whether there have been significant developments in 
the national identity case law of the ECJ after the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Lisbon, and suggest that the general approach of the ECJ has 
not significantly changed. I will also argue that the main developments 
related to Article 4(2) TEU have not taken place before the ECJ, but in 
national arenas, notably in France and Germany. In the fourth and final 
part, I will return to the issue of the differentiation of national identity 
claims and conclude that one category is understood by the ECJ as an 
ordinary justification of national measures restricting one of the market 
freedoms, while the other category of claims prompts the ECJ to defer to 
national authorities.
2. Defining national identity
As noted by Advocate General Maduro, national identity has been 
part of EU law from the beginning.1 It has been present in the Treaties 
since the adoption of the Treaty of Maastricht, where it was introduced 
in Article F(1) of the TEU, which states that ‘The Union shall respect the 
1 Case C-213/07 Michaniki AE v Ethniko Symvoulio Radiotileorasis and Ypourgos Epikra-
teias [2008] ECR I-9999, Opinion of AG Maduro, para 31.
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national identities of its Member States, whose systems of government 
are based on the principles of democracy’. The Article was subsequently 
renumbered and rephrased to become Article 6(3) of the Treaty of Am-
sterdam. The Amsterdam provision simply provided that ‘The Union shall 
respect the national identities of its Member States.’ Article I-5 of the Tre-
aty establishing a Constitution for Europe rephrased the provision, the 
identical wording of which subsequently became paragraph (2) of Article 
4 of the TEU. 
According to Article 4(2) of the TEU:
[t]he Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the 
Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their fun-
damental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regi-
onal and local self-government. It shall respect their essential State 
functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, 
maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security. In 
particular, national security remains the sole responsibility of each 
Member State.
When compared to earlier statements, Article 4(2) speaks about ‘fun-
damental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional 
and local self-government’, while the earlier text generally referred to na-
tional identities. It would seem that an added value of the new wording, 
which is ascribed to the chairman of Working Group V of the European 
Convention, Mr Henning Christophersen, is the explicit reference to na-
tional constitutional identity, whatever this may be.2 In a way, it was the 
semantic force of Article I-5 of the Constitutional Treaty that narrowed 
the discourse on national identity into discourse about national constitu-
tional identity. The Treaty of Lisbon followed suit. 
The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines identity as ‘sameness in all 
that constitutes the objective reality of a thing’ and ‘the condition of being 
the same with something described or asserted’. In brief, identity can be 
described as a state of being the same as one thing and, at the same time, 
2 The European Convention, which prepared the text of the Constitutional Treaty, dis-
cussed a number of proposals as to what should be explicitly mentioned as a part of na-
tional identity. Among the proposals, there were: ‘constitutional and political structures 
including regional and local self-government and the legal status of churches and religious 
bodies’ (Altmeier) and also ‘language, national citizenship, military service, the educational 
systems, the welfare systems, including the public health systems, the system for perso-
nal taxation, the right of abortion’. See European Convention, Secretariat, Working Group 
V, Working Document 28, paper of the Chairman Mr Henning Christophersen on priority 
issues regarding complementary competence (circulated at the last meeting of WG V on 6 
September 2002), Brussels 24 September 2002. Von Bogdandy and Schill name the clause, 
after the chairman of the Working Group, the Christophersen Clause. A von Bogdandy and 
S Schill, ‘Overcoming Absolute Primacy: Respect for National Identity under the Lisbon 
Treaty’ 48 CML Rev (2011) 1417.
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differentiated from everything else. The word ‘national’ refers to nation 
Member States of the European Union. The words ‘shall respect’ and ‘in-
herent in their fundamental structures’ imply a normative claim that in 
certain essential areas of regulation, defined as ‘fundamental structures, 
political and constitutional’, the regulatory powers of the Member States 
should enjoy immunity from the encroachment of EU law.
Taken together, the wording of Article 4(2) TEU would appear to pro-
tect the right of the Member States and their citizens3 to define, inde-
pendently of EU law, such elements of their constitutional and political 
order which make them unique and at the same time different from any 
other Member State or, indeed, from the European Union at large. Such 
essential elements constitute the specific content of what is referred to as 
national constitutional identity. In a certain sense, from the Lisbon Treaty 
onwards, national identity as a technical term under Article 4(2) TEU lar-
gely coincides with national constitutional identity. Therefore, I shall use 
the two terms interchangeably.
 2.1 Article 4(2) TEU identity and Article 2 TEU values
One part of the national identity of the Member States is construed 
in terms of the rest of the World. Namely, by being a Member State of the 
EU, a State is differentiated from all non-EU states.4 Membership of the 
EU forms an inextricable part of the Member States’ identity.5 In norma-
tive terms, acceptance of certain EU-specific values contributes to what 
makes the national identities of the Member States unique. As a result of 
membership of the EU, the national identities of the Member States are 
understood to comprise the values of Article 2 TEU on which the EU is 
founded, in particular:
values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, 
the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of 
persons belonging to minorities ... in a society in which pluralism, 
non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality betwe-
en women and men prevail.
 
3 Von Bogdandy and Schill distinguish between an objective and subjective understan-
ding of national identity, the former being based on objectively discernible criteria, such as 
a common language, history or political institutions, and the latter being defined by the ‘will 
of individuals to belong to a community’. Von Bogdandy and Schill (n 2) 1430. The case law 
of the ECJ based on Article 4(2) TEU and its earlier forms appears to protect objective nati-
onal identity as defined by national law and national institutions. If the interpretation were 
stretched to include the subjective element, the individual choice of belonging to a certain 
national identity would amount to an enforceable right under EU law. 
4 For the importance of otherness in the construction of identity, see eg W Sadurski, ‘Eu-
ropean Constitutional Identity?’ EUI Working Papers, LAW No 2006/33, 7-8. 
5 Von Bogdandy and Schill (n 2) 1426. 
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Respect for these values is a minimum requirement for EU mem-
bership. Once a State accepts these values by joining the EU, this beco-
mes a rebuttable presumption that can be rebutted only subject to the 
procedure laid down by Article 7 TEU.
It can be said that Article 2 TEU defines those elements of national 
identity that are, at the same time, postulated by membership of the 
European Union and without which neither the Member States nor the 
European Union itself can claim legitimacy.
However, the concept of national identity is broader than the values 
enshrined in Article 2 TEU. Namely, the elements of national identity 
(constitutional identity included), such as Member States’ fundamental 
political and constitutional structures, law and order, or national secu-
rity, are construed independently at the national level. In other words, 
national identity and European values do not necessarily overlap. Ne-
vertheless, it is a normative requirement of EU membership that even 
such elements of national identity which are constructed independently 
and regardless of the EU context, still have to comply with the values 
of Article 2 TEU. The history of the 20th century teaches us that in the 
absence of this requirement, national ‘fundamental structures, political 
and constitutional’ would be capable of pursuing a variety of morally 
problematic ends. 
That being said, one can conclude that not any kind of national 
identity would be tolerated within EU membership, but only the kind that 
promotes the values on which the Union is founded or which is at least 
neutral in respect of them.
In other words, the constitutional framework of the EU distinguishes 
between explicit ‘good’ and implied and dormant ‘bad’ national identities, 
the former being worthy of protection and the latter not.6 This was, after 
all, implicit in Article F(1) of the Maastricht Treaty, which linked respect 
for national identity to respect for the principles of democracy on the part 
of the Member States.
Figure 1 – overlapping identities
6 Arguably, a national constitutional provision reserving the right to vote to men would 
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2.2 National identity and other Treaty values
A separate set of values, applicable to all areas of EU regulation, is 
laid down in Part I, Title II, Articles 9 and 10 of the TFEU. These provisi-
ons enshrine values that have to be respected in defining and implemen-
ting EU policies. They include a high level of employment, guaranteeing 
adequate social protection, fighting against social exclusion, providing 
a high level of education and training, protecting human health, and 
fighting against discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, reli-
gion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. The function of these 
provisions is anything but clear. The values enshrined therein may cre-
ate restraints for supranational policy-making. Most of them have been 
granted constitutional protection at the national level and arguably may 
constitute part of national constitutional identity. The question, however, 
is whether reliance on Articles 9 and 10 TFEU may broaden the regula-
tory discretion of the Member States and change the balance between EU 
and national law.
Advocate General Cruz Villalon argued in his Opinion in Palhota7 
that the ECJ should recognise broader discretion for the Member States 
in the pursuit of the values listed in Article 9 of the TFEU, such as a 
high level of employment, the guarantee of adequate social protection, 
the fight against social exclusion, and a high level of education, training 
and protection of human health. Accordingly, mandatory requirements 
justifying a departure from market freedoms should no longer be inter-
preted narrowly. For example, the social protection of workers should 
be taken into account in the performance of a proportionality test when 
assessing whether national measures restricting the free movement of 
services are justified. The result of such reasoning would be that a Mem-
ber State is allowed to maintain its own understanding of social policy, 
for example providing adequate social protection in such a way that it 
could narrow the scope of application of, for example, the free movement 
of workers. This is essentially no different from claiming that a high level 
of social protection constitutes part of the national identity of certain 
Member States and justifies a departure from market freedoms.
In Palhota, the issue was raised whether a national measure requi-
ring an employer, established in one Member State and posting workers 
to the territory of another, to send a prior declaration of posting can be 
justified in the context of the free movement of services. After having pre-
sented its proportionality analysis in paragraph 49, the ECJ went on to 
assess the appropriateness and necessity of the national measure. The 
ECJ found that there is a less restrictive measure for the employer, na-
mely, ‘to report beforehand to the local authorities on the presence of one 
7 See Case C-515/08 Palhota, Opinion of AG Cruz Villalon, paras 51-53, not yet reported.
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or more deployed workers, the anticipated duration of their presence and 
the provision or provisions of services justifying the deployment’.8 
While the Advocate General’s suggestion may have provided discreti-
on to the Member State to choose from among equally effective measures, 
and select one which serves the protection of workers better, the ECJ 
maintained the traditional test of the least restrictive alternative for the 
free movement of services.
Palhota is the first and only9 post-Lisbon case so far where the exi-
sting free-movement case law was challenged by an Advocate General 
and survived. Accordingly, a fully developed proportionality test rema-
ins applicable to situations where Member States invoke the mandatory 
requirements mentioned in Articles 9 and 10 TFEU. After the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the ECJ has even strengthened the level of 
scrutiny by requiring national legislation allegedly promoting a high level 
of protection of human health to be applied in a consistent and systema-
tic manner.10
2.3 National identity and regulatory competence
EU law restricts regulatory autonomy of the Member States in both 
the area of Union and Member State competence. The same holds for the 
national identity guarantee under Article 4(2) TEU.
First, as a part of Article 4 TEU, the national identity guarantee 
represents part of a more general system of co-operation between the 
Union and the Member States. Upon closer examination, Article 4 TEU 
lays down several different guarantees that have to be understood in the 
context of Article 5 TEU.
The first paragraph of Article 4 TEU is a competence rule.11 It stipu-
lates the residual powers of the Member States, and in this way comple-
ments the principle of conferral laid down by Article 5(1) TEU. The Union 
is based on the principle of conferred powers, the residue of which rests 
with the Member States. In this light, it is perfectly clear that, as a matter 
of competence, the national identity guarantee refers but, as I will shortly 
8 Palhota (n 7) para 51. 
9 A similar suggestion that national courts should be granted more discretion was in-
troduced by AG Cruz Villalon and ignored by the ECJ in a procedural context. See Case 
C-173/09 Georgi Ivanov Elchinov v Natsionalna zdravnoosiguritelna kasa, not yet reported.
10 Joined Cases C-570/07 and C-571/07 José Manuel Blanco Pérez and María del Pilar 
Chao Gómez v Consejería de Salud y Servicios Sanitarios (C-570/07) and Principado de Astu-
rias (C-571/07), para 94, not yet reported. For an analysis of consistency and coherence in 
the case law, see G Mathisen, ‘Consistency and Coherence as Conditions for Justification 
of Member State Measures Restricting Free Movement’, 47 CML Rev (2010) 1021.
11 Art 4(1) TEU: ‘In accordance with Article 5, competences not conferred upon the Union 
in the Treaties remain with the Member States.’
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show, is not limited to the powers conferred on the EU. In its regulatory 
dimension, Article 4(2) TEU can be understood as a rule that delimits 
the exercise of the powers conferred. In other words, it can be interpre-
ted as prohibiting the Union from acting even in areas where regulatory 
competences have been conferred, if the exercise of such competences 
would affect Member States’ national identity. Arguably, the same would 
hold even in situations where the exercise of EU competence would ‘ge-
nuinely have as its object the improvement of the conditions for the esta-
blishment and functioning of the internal market’ within the meaning of 
paragraph 84 of the Tobacco Advertising case.12
Furthermore, if national identity is to be distinguished from the prin-
ciples of subsidiarity and proportionality enshrined in Article 5(3) and (4) 
TEU, then it cannot come under national parliaments’ scrutiny under the 
Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and propor-
tionality. A plausible interpretation would be that the national identity 
guarantee should be applicable even in cases where an act of the EU has 
already passed the national parliaments’ muster, ie despite it being in 
compliance with the principle of subsidiarity.
Alternatively, it could be argued that since national identity con-
struction pertains to the Member States, it represents an inherent part of 
the subsidiarity principle. A consequence of this approach would be that 
once national parliaments have not objected to the adoption of a rule on 
subsidiarity grounds, it is presumed that the rule in question respects 
national constitutional identity. There is no support for either interpreta-
tion in the parliamentary practice of the Member States so far.
Secondly, Article 4(2) TEU also plays a role in the area of Member 
State exclusive competence. While one could expect that in this area the 
national identity guarantee is uncontested by the very nature of exclu-
sive competence, it is not the case. Namely, it is well established in the 
case law of the ECJ that even in areas where the Member States have 
exclusive competence, such as when regulating civil status13 or higher 
12 Case C-376/98 Federal Republic of Germany v European Parliament and Council of the 
European Union [2000] ECR I-8419.
13 Case C-267/06 Tadao Maruko v Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen [2007] ECR 
I-1757, para 55: ‘civil status and the benefits flowing therefrom are matters which fall 
within the competence of the Member States and Community law does not detract from 
that competence. However, it must be recalled that in the exercise of that competence the 
Member States must comply with Community law and, in particular, with the provisions 
relating to the principle of non-discrimination.’ See also Case C-372/04 Watts [2006] ECR 
I-4325, para 92; Case C-444/05 Stamatelaki [2007] ECR I-3185, para 23; Case 120/78 
Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1979] ECR 649, para 8; Case 
C-76/05 Schwarz and Gootjes-Schwarz [2007] ECR I-6849, para 70; Joined Cases C-11/06 
and C-12/06 Morgan and Bucher [2007] ECR I-9161, para 24; and most recently, in the 
context of higher education, Case C-73/08 Nicolas Bressol and Others and Céline Chaverot 
and Others v Gouvernement de la Communauté française [2010] ECR I-2735, para 28.
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education,14 their competence cannot be exercised against EU law. The 
most recent confirmation of this position can be found in Rottman, regar-
ding the regulation of national citizenship.15 As I will demonstrate below, 
in Rottman, which both the referring court and the Advocate General 
understood as a national identity case, the ECJ acknowledged the re-
gulatory competence of the Member State concerned, but nevertheless 
asserted its case law, according to which the Member States are bound 
by EU law even in areas of their competence.16 Thus, it becomes clear 
that Article 4(2) TEU is applicable in areas of Member State exclusive 
competence.
The obligation of the Member States to respect EU law is also pre-
sent with regard to national procedural law, where it is conventionally 
understood that the Member States enjoy national procedural autonomy 
subject to respect for the principles of effectiveness and equivalence. 
However, as Bobek rightly points out, such national autonomy does not 
really exist, since even national procedural legislation is subject to the 
scrutiny of the ECJ.17 Clearly any claims that certain features of national 
procedural law represent part of national constitutional identity are equ-
ally doomed to failure,18 as was demonstrated in Elchinov.19
A number of cases that deal with national identity values have been 
located in the sphere of Member State competence, such as the right to 
life, human dignity, the nationality of teachers and notaries, republican 
government, the use of national languages, the civic status of citizens 
and, indeed, the regulation of national constitutional procedures. Since 
national identity claims will typically be emphasised more in areas of 
Member States’ exclusive competence, it can be reasonably expected that 
fine-tuning between market freedoms and national identity claims will 
take place along the lines sketched by Roman Herzog and Lüder Gerken 
in their comment published in 2008 following the contentious Mangold20 
14 Bressol (n 13).
15 Case C-135/08 Janko Rottman v Freistaat Bayern [2010] ECR I-1449.
16 Rottman (n 15) para 41: ‘Nevertheless, the fact that a matter falls within the competence 
of the Member States does not alter the fact that, in situations covered by European Union 
law, the national rules concerned must have due regard to the latter’; and para 45: ‘Thus, 
the Member States must, when exercising their powers in the sphere of nationality, have 
due regard to European Union law’. See also the case law cited therein.
17 M Bobek, ‘Why there is no Principle Of “Procedural Autonomy” of the Member States’, 
forthcoming in B de Witte and H Micklitz (eds), The European Court of Justice and the Auto-
nomy of the Member States (Intersentia 2011).
18 However, the ECJ is prepared to allow an implicit margin of discretion. For a recent 
example, see Case C-291/09 Francesco Guarnieri & Cie (not yet reported), where the ECJ 
took the position that a national rule is ‘purely procedural and its purpose is not to regulate 
trade in goods.’ See para 16. Accordingly, the impact of the national procedural rule was 
‘too uncertain and indirect.’
19 Elchinov (n 9).
20 Case C-144/04 Werner Mangold v Rüdiger Helm [2005] ECR I-9981.
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judgment of the ECJ.21 The tension can be summarised as follows: either 
the ECJ will start to exercise self-restraint, or national constitutional 
courts will have to take the protection of national constitutional identity 
more seriously.
3. National identity before the Treaty of Lisbon
Roughly speaking, national identity jurisprudence before the Treaty 
of Lisbon went through three evolutionary phases. In the first phase, na-
tional identity was not claimed as such, but was recognised in an implicit 
way by means of national insistence on constitutional standards for the 
protection of fundamental rights. The second phase followed in the early 
‘90s and was characterised by the development of a margin of discreti-
on. The third pre-Lisbon phase resulted in the concession that national 
constitutional identity is not absolute. This third phase heralded a su-
bsequent differentiation of national constitutional rules into two classes: 
fundamental constitutional provisions ‘worthy’ of deferring to national 
authorities and other constitutional provisions treated like ordinary ju-
stifications.
 3.1 The ‘old’ national identity law
Judicial reference to national constitutional identity is well discussed 
in legal scholarship. Two well-known references are the early Solange dialo-
gue between the German Federal Constitutional Court and the ECJ,22 and 
the Frontini judgment of the Italian Constitutional Court establishing the 
theory of countervailing power to the supranational transfer of sovereignty, 
ie so-called controlimiti.23 According to the Frontini reservation, the transfer 
of sovereignty, which is inherent in the Founding Treaties, cannot include 
the transfer of powers to Community institutions to ‘violate the fundamen-
tal principles of the Constitution or the inalienable rights of man.’
German and Italian reactions were prompted by the evolving doctri-
ne of supremacy, which after its inception in Costa v ENEL24 was crystalli-
21 R Herzog and L Gerken, ‘Stop the European Court of Justice’, Zentrum für Europäische 
Politik, Freiburg 2008. Published originally in Frankfurter Algemeine Zeitung (8 September 
2008). See also EUobserver, 11 September <http://euobserver.com/9/26714> accessed 8 
August 2011. The core argument is as follows: ‘both labor market policy and social policy 
are still core competences of the Member States. However, this case clearly demonstrates 
to what extent EU regulation and EU jurisdiction nevertheless interfere in the governing of 
these core competences.’
22 Solange I, BVerfGE 37, 271; Solange II, BVerfGE 73, 339; Maastricht, BVerfGE 89, 155.
23 Italian Constitutional Court Case no 183/73 Frontini v Ministero delle Finanze in A Op-
penheimer (ed), The Relationship between European Community Law and National Law: The 
Cases (CUP 2005); M Cartabia, ‘Nuovi sviluppi nelle “competenze comunitarie” della Corte co-
stituzionale, nota a sentenza n. 232 del 1989’, in Giurisprudenza costituzionale 1989, 1012.
24 BVerfGE 37, 271, 2 BvL 52/71.
21CYELP 7 [2011] 11-41
sed by the ECJ in the Internationale Handelsgesellschaft case where the 
Court boldly observed that: 
the validity of a Community measure or its effect within a Member 
State cannot be affected by allegations that it runs counter to either 
fundamental rights as formulated by the constitution of that State or 
the principles of a national constitutional structure.25
The ECJ followed the same line of reasoning in its subsequent case 
law. For example, in the Belgian Flemish Government case,26 the Flemish 
government attempted to justify discrimination on the grounds of a lack 
of regulatory competence in the matter, which according to the Belgian 
constitution belongs to the federal government. The ECJ shunned the 
argument by reiterating its earlier case law, stating that ‘a Member State 
cannot plead provisions, practices or situations prevailing in its domestic 
legal order, including those resulting from the constitutional organisation 
of that State, to justify the failure to observe obligations arising under 
Community law’.27
Advocate General Sharpston rightly pointed to Article 27 of the 1969 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, according to which ‘[a] party 
may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its 
failure to perform a treaty.’28 It is now widely accepted that the Vienna 
Convention also refers to national constitutional law.29 Nevertheless, Ger-
man insistence on high standards of protection of fundamental rights 
25 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Ge-
treide und Futtermittel [1970] ECR 1125.
26 Case C-212/06 Government of Communauté française and Gouvernement wallon v Gou-
vernement flamand [2008] ECR I-1683.
27 Government of Communauté française and Gouvernement wallon (n 26) para 58. See 
also Case C-87/02 Commission v Italy [2004] ECR I-5975, para 38; Case 69/81 Commissi-
on v Belgium [1982] ECR 163, para 5; Case C-323/96 Commission v Belgium [1998] ECR 
I-5063, para 42; Case C-236/99 Commission v Belgium [2000] ECR I-5657, para 23; Case 
C-111/00 Commission v Austria [2001] ECR I-7555, para 12.
28 See Government of Communauté française and Gouvernement wallon (n 26), Opinion of 
AG Sharpston fn 57.
29 Concerning national constitutional law, André de Hoogh draws attention to the drafting 
history of Article 27 of the Vienna Convention which ‘confirms that the reference to internal 
law comprises the constitution of a State party. In fact, the amendment proposed by Paki-
stan initially claimed “[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be 
performed by them in good faith, and no party may invoke the provisions of its constitution 
or its laws as an excuse for its failure to perform this duty” (Vienna Conference, Documents, 
p 145; adopted: 55 in favor, none against, 30 abstentions (Vienna Conference, First Sessi-
on, p 158)). Though certain hesitations may be observed on the part of the participants in 
the Vienna Conference in 1968-1969 to support the resulting provision (adopted: 73 in fa-
vour, 2 against, 24 abstentions; Vienna Conference, Second Session, p 54), as to this parti-
cular point, the provision did find favor and only two States (Venezuela and Iran) expressed 
their opposition suggesting the primacy of their constitutional law over treaties. Two States 
(Venezuela and Guatemala) specifically attached reservations on this point, against which 
objections have been raised by certain other States’, A de Hoogh, ‘The Relationship betwe-
en National Law and International Law in the Report of the Georgia Fact-Finding Mission’ 
(EJIL: Talk!) <www.ejiltalk.org> accessed 15 July 2011.
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prompted the development of significant fundamental rights case law and 
ultimately to the adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
EU.
3.2 Second phase: margin of discretion
Margin of discretion is the power exercised by the Member States 
in areas of regulation falling within the scope of EU law. In such areas, 
Member States can justify derogations from EU law by demonstrating a 
broadly defined legitimate regulatory aim.30 To justify the aim as legitima-
te, a Member State can rely on a variety of self-defined interests that need 
not be shared by other Member States. However, such interests must not 
run against the values of EU law and must pass the proportionality test. 
Margin of discretion started to play a more significant role in the early 
1990s following the judgment of the ECJ in SPUC v Grogan.31
For the purpose of the present discussion, it is useful to distinguish 
between two different types of discretion.
 The first type is the discretion that Member States exercise in the 
implementation of EU law, notably, directives. Such discretion may per-
tain to the legislative authorities32 or to the national courts when inter-
preting national law.33 The Van Duyn situation, where national public 
authorities had to interpret public policy justification, also falls within 
this type. This first type of discretion does not give the Member States a 
licence to depart from compliance with EU law but, on the contrary, dis-
cretion to interpret national law in line with EU law.34
The second type of discretion is of constitutional significance and 
concerns potentially competing national and European values. In a case 
where a European and national rule or value do not coincide, one of 
the two has to give way to the other. In such situations, both the EU 
and Member State have normative claims that the European or national 
30 In areas that fall outside the scope of EU law, one cannot speak about discretion, but 
Member States are still under an obligation to ‘have a due regard to EU law’. In Hohfeldian 
terms, one could say that Member States enjoy immunity from application of EU law in are-
as where the EU has exercised its regulatory competence. WN Hohfeld, ‘Fundamental Legal 
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning’ 26 Yale LJ (1916-1917) 710, 711.
31 Case C-159/90 The Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland Ltd v Stephen 
Grogan and others [1991] ECR 4685.
32 See eg Joined Cases C-482/01 and C-493/01 Georgios Orfanopoulos and Others and 
Raffaele Oliveri v Land Baden-Württemberg [2004] ECR 5257, para 114; Case C-271/91 
Marshall [1993] ECR I-4367, para 37; Joined Cases C-397/01 to C-403/01 Bernhard 
Pfeiffer and others [2004] ECR I-8835, para 105.
33 Case C-208/05 ITC Innovative Technology Center GmbH v Bundesagentur für Arbeit 
[2007] ECR I-181, paras 68 and 69. The ECJ allowed the discretion of the national court to 
be used to interpret national law in line with EU law. 
34 Case 41/74 Yvonne van Duyn v Home Office [1974] ECR 1337, para 18. See also 30/77, 
Régina v Pierre Bouchereau [1977] ECR 1999, para 34.
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rule or value should control the other. When the two rules or values are 
allowed to co-exist without an imminent resolution, one can speak about 
either an implied or an explicit margin of discretion.
 The ECJ has so far recognised margin of discretion in explicit and 
implied ways. Examples of an explicit margin of discretion are Schmidber-
ger35 and Omega.36 Implicitly, the ECJ granted a margin of discretion in 
SPUC v Grogan and Melki and Abdeli.37
Implied margin of discretion is best illustrated in SPUC v Grogan,38 
where the ECJ had to address the tension between a national constituti-
onal rule defining the right to life and the free movement of services. As 
is commonly known, the tension was resolved on jurisdictional grounds 
and Community law was found to be inapplicable.
The significance of SPUC v Grogan is in highlighting the fact that na-
tional constitutional values may escape the scrutiny of EU law, as long as 
they are outside its scope. Nevertheless, soon after the case had been de-
cided, Ireland was able to introduce a specific protocol to the Maastricht 
Treaty, which granted immunity and according to which nothing ‘in the 
Treaty on European Union, or in the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities, or in the Treaties or Acts modifying or supplementing tho-
se Treaties, shall affect the application in Ireland of Article 40.3.3 of the 
Constitution of Ireland’.39
The Protocol amounts to a constitutional amendment, the purpose 
of which was to prevent the Grogan situation from re-emerging in an eco-
nomic context and not being resolved by functional reasoning.
Indeed, jurisdictional rules may relieve the ECJ from passing its 
judgment on highly sensitive national constitutional choices, such as 
the prohibition of the public display of communist symbols in the Attila 
Vajnai case.40 While it is easy to agree that the prohibition of the red 
star represents part of Hungarian post-communist identity, constructed 
against negative historical experiences, the non-economic nature of the 
activity put the case outside the scope of EU law.
Implied margin of discretion is, as one can see, of a jurisdictional 
nature, and the ECJ controls it through functional concepts such as eco-
nomic activity, undertaking, official authority or internal situation.
35 Case C-112/00 Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v Republik 
Österreich [2003] ECR I-5659.
36 Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v Oberbürgermei-
sterin der Bundesstadt Bonn [2004] ECR I-9609.
37 Joined Cases C-188/10 and C-189/10 Aziz Melki and Sélim Abdeli, not yet reported. 
38 SPUC v Grogan (n 31).
39 Protocol annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaties establishing the 
European Communities.
40 Case C-328/04 Criminal proceedings against Attila Vajnai [2005] ECR I-8577.
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A more complicated situation arises when a conflict cannot be avoi-
ded by jurisdictional means. In such situations, one value has to prevail 
over the other. The ECJ has already dealt with such situations in Schmid-
berger, Omega and Küçükdeveçı.41 In all such situations, the following 
general rule applies: once a case is brought within the scope of EU law, 
either by direct application of a Treaty rule or by a directive, a rule or 
general principle of EU law can have exclusionary effects. This is also an 
instance where the concept of national identity can have an impact and 
possibly restrict the exclusionary effects of EU law. Hic Rhodus, hic salta!
The three mentioned cases are, however, different as to the nature of 
the protected national values. In Schmidberger, it was freedom of assem-
bly as a fundamental right, in Omega it was human dignity as a funda-
mental constitutional value, while in Küçükdeveçı it was an instrument of 
social policy.42 Moreover, while freedom of assembly is a value endorsed 
by the EU and all the Member States, human dignity, was, before the en-
try into force of the Charter of Rights of the EU,43 a specific characteristic 
of the German constitutional order that was compatible with EU values44 
but not necessarily recognised at the constitutional level by other Mem-
ber States. The case is similar to social policy measures, where the Mem-
ber States, by the very nature of the area and Treaty-entrenched choice, 
exercise wide discretion. Do these differences have any significance in 
respect of the breadth of the margin of discretion?
In all three cases, the ECJ insisted on the legitimate aim of national 
regulation.45 As long as that aim is juxtaposed with a market freedom, it 
is legitimate, as it is compatible with the broader referential framework 
(general principles) of EU law. In two out of the three mentioned cases, 
this was the case, as national measures were found to be compatible or, 
at least, reconcilable with general principles of EU law.46 In Küçükdeveçi, 
the national measure was found to be in accordance with the social policy 
justifications provided for by Directive 2000/78,47 but not in accordance 
with a broader referential rule: the general principle of non-discriminati-
on. In other words, there was no compatibility between national law and 
EU law at the level of the broader referential framework of the EU, and so 
the national law had to be set aside.
41 Case C-555/07 Seda Küçükdeveçi v Swedex GmbH & Co KG [2010] ECR I-365.
42 Küçükdeveçi (n 41) para 36.
43 The Charter guarantees human dignity in Article 1.
44 Omega (n 36) para 34.
45 Schmidberger (n 35) paras 79 and 80; Küçükdeveçi (n 41) para 36; Omega (n 36) para 35.
46 Schmidberger (n 35) paras 71-73; Omega (n 36) para 34.
47 Küçükdeveçi (n 41) para 36. See Article 6(1) of Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 
November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and 
occupation, OJ L 303, 2 December.2000, 16-22.
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If Article 4(2) TEU has an effect, it should be tested in situations 
where an element of national identity does not coincide with the broader 
referential value framework of the EU. Neither Schmidberger nor Omega 
is such a case, bearing in mind that the protection of fundamental rights 
is an important element of identity of both the EU and its Member States.
Nor is Küçükdeveçı, though for different reasons. Policy, including 
social policy, is a variable of national government. It is at the discretion 
of the executive branch to formulate and implement various policies, and 
for that reason there can be no equation between policy and national 
constitutional identity. EU law does not prescribe any given direction 
in which Member States should frame their social policy and does not 
interfere with Member States’ choice to constitute themselves as a wel-
fare state. A genuine conflict between EU law and national constitutio-
nal identity would emerge only if EU law touched upon the fundamental 
constitutional choice of a Member State, for example, to constitute itself 
within a certain socio-economic or political framework.48
To conclude, the second period in which the national identity gua-
rantee was framed did not bring about a meaningful definition of natio-
nal identity or consequently a resolution of the tension between national 
identity and internal market freedoms.
3.3 Third phase: differentiation of constitutional rules
It was only after the signing of the failed Constitutional Treaty that 
the national identity guarantee was linked directly not to a vague concept 
of national identity but to a somewhat more concrete concept of constitu-
tional identity. It was only after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon 
that this linkage obtained legal significance.
Parallel with Treaty incorporation, an awareness emerged that not 
every national constitutional claim automatically represents a constitu-
ent part of national constitutional identity. While AG Maduro suggested 
in Michaniki that a contested rule of the Greek constitution should be 
understood as an element of national identity,49 the ECJ simply assessed 
the contested rule according to the usual proportionality test.50 Its legi-
timacy depended on the extent it pursued the interests of transparency 
and equal treatment, which at the same time are principles defined by 
EU law.
The approach of the ECJ in Michaniki led Besselink to suggest that:
48 Arguably, such a conflict would emerge if a Member State opted to abandon a market 
economy, which is a condition of EU membership.
49 Maduro (n 1) para 33.
50 See V Kosta, ‘Case C-213/07 Michaniki AE v Ethniko Simvoulio Radiotileorasis, Ipourgos 
Epikratias’ 5 Eur Const L Rev (2009) 501.
26 Siniša Rodin: National Identity and Market Freedoms after the Treaty of Lisbon
more trivial provisions of national constitutional law – those which 
do not form part of the constitutional identity of the Member State 
– are not granted such priority [over EU law], and the normal Costa 
doctrine of the priority of directly effective EU law prevails.51
Von Bogdandy and Schill hold the same and suggest that ‘only fun-
damental structures of the Member States are relevant.’ 52 If this interpre-
tation is correct, then the function of Article 4(2) TEU would be to create 
a referential framework for the ECJ when making a distinction between 
essential and non-essential elements of national constitutions. The des-
cribed approach would require different intensities of judicial scrutiny.
In the case of non-essential elements, the ECJ would perform a pro-
portionality test under which a national identity claim would not be an 
automatic justification for departure from economic freedoms. Provided 
a regulatory aim is legitimate, a national measure will still need to be 
appropriate and necessary, regardless of whether it can be characterised 
as an element of national identity or not.53 Member States will enjoy a 
margin of discretion, however, only insofar as their measures can be re-
conciled with the broad referential framework of EU law.54 In cases where 
essential elements are concerned, the ECJ would defer the decision to the 
national judicial or legislative authorities, with (Omega) or without (SPUC 
v Grogan) reserving a proportionality test for itself.
In support of such an interpretation is the fact that so far the ECJ 
has been more generous in granting a margin of appreciation in cases in-
volving fundamental right guarantees and national constitutional values 
than in cases involving ordinary national law, even in cases of well-esta-
blished national civil law principles.55
AG Maduro himself implicitly recognised in paragraph 33 of his Opi-
nion in Michaniki that some constitutional rules are capable of triggering 
51 LFM Besselink, ‘National and Constitutional Identity before and after Lisbon’ 6 Utrecht 
L Rev 3 (2010) 36, 49.
52 Von Bogdandy and Schill (n 2) 1431.
53 Schmidberger (n 35) paras 82-87; Kücükdeveçi (n 41) para 37; Omega (n 36) para 36.
54 As far as margin of discretion is concerned, in Küçükdeveçı ((n 41) para 38), the ECJ 
restated its well-established position that Member States enjoy a wide margin of discretion 
in framing their respective social policies. In Schmidberger ((n 35) para 89), a broad margin 
was allowed to national authorities in striking a balance between a fundamental right and 
market freedom. In Omega ((n 36) para 31), again, the margin was decided as being broad. 
55 In Traghetti del Mediterraneo, the ECJ ruled that EU law precluded the application of 
a national law which excludes state liability for damages for breach of EU law for damage 
caused to individuals by an infringement attributable to a court adjudicating in the last in-
stance, or which restricts liability for damages arising from erroneous application of EU law 
by a national court to cases of intentional fault, serious misconduct and denial of justice. In 
such a case, the Simmenthal mandate is fully applicable and the national court has to set 
the national legal rule aside. Case C-173/03 Traghetti del Mediterraneo SpA v Repubblica 
Italiana [2006] ECR I-5177, para 46.
27CYELP 7 [2011] 11-41
the national identity guarantee under Article 4(2) TEU, while some are 
not.56 The same thought was introduced by AG Kokkot in UGT-Rioja,57 
where she interpreted the ECJ’s position concerning the balance betwe-
en respect for national constitutional principles and observance of EU 
Law.58 According to AG Kokkot, while the ECJ respects local autonomy as 
defined by national constitutions, ‘the Member States cannot hide behind 
their constitutional order and circumvent the prohibition on aid under 
Article 87 EC through a purely formal transfer of legislative powers’.59 
Whether this was the case or not was left to the national court to decide.60
As far as the ECJ is concerned, as early as 1996, in Commission v 
Luxembourg,61 the ECJ recognised national identity as a legitimate aim, 
though subject to the application of a proportionality test.62 Accordingly, 
a Member State may not invoke national identity in order to derogate 
from a market freedom as long as there is a less restrictive alternative to 
freedom of movement. 
More recently, the ECJ supported the differentiation thesis in 
Rottman, decided in March 2010,63 where the referring court suggested 
that ‘the effect of assuming that there existed, in European Union law, an 
obligation to refrain from withdrawing naturalisation obtained by decep-
tion would be to strike at the heart of the sovereign power of the Member 
States’.64
In his Opinion in Rottman, AG Maduro suggested that the power to 
deprive a person of Member State citizenship represents an ‘essential ele-
ment’ of a Member State’s national identity, since it affects the composi-
tion of the national body politic. Accordingly, making national citizenship 
dependent on EU citizenship would contravene Article 6(3) TEU (now 4(2) 
TEU). This, however, follows, not from the national identity provision alo-
ne, but from the very architecture of Union citizenship, which is explicitly 
56 See paragraph 33 of the Opinion: ‘It is, nevertheless, necessary to point out that that 
respect owed to the constitutional identity of the Member States cannot be understood as 
an absolute obligation to defer to all national constitutional rules.’ The wording ‘all national 
constitutional rules’ implies that there may be some constitutional rules which automati-
cally trigger deference.
57 Joined Cases C-428/06 to C-434/06 Unión General de Trabajadores de La Rioja (UGT-
Rioja) and Others v Juntas Generales del Territorio Histórico de Vizcaya and Others [2008] 
ECR I-6747, paras 56-57.
58 The Advocate General referred to Case C-88/03 Portuguese Republic v Commission of the 
European Communities [2006] ECR I-7115.
59 Portuguese Republic v Commission of the European Communities (n 58), Opinion of AG 
Kokkot, para 57.
60 UGT-Rioja (n 57) para 144.
61 Case C-473/93 Commission v Luxembourg [1996] ECR I-3207, para 35.
62 Commission v Luxembourg (n 61).
63 Rottman (n 15), Opinion of AG Maduro, para 25.
64 Rottman (n 15) para 32.
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made secondary to national citizenship. Accordingly, the ECJ ignored the 
Advocate General’s argument and decided the case on the grounds of the 
exclusionary effects of EU citizenship law.65
Even more recently, national identity was claimed as a derogation in 
the ‘Notaries’ Cases’, decided in May 2011.66 The argument introduced by 
the Grand Duchy was that:
since the use of the Luxembourgish language is necessary in the per-
formance of notarial activities, the nationality condition at issue is 
intended to ensure respect for the history, culture, tradition and na-
tional identity of Luxembourg within the meaning of Article 6(3) EU
 (which was applicable at the material time).67 However, the ECJ was 
not impressed by the argument, and invoked its earlier position according 
to which national identity can be ‘effectively safeguarded otherwise than 
by a general exclusion of nationals of the other Member States’.68 What 
is noteworthy is that the ECJ, in paragraph 124 of the judgment, spoke 
about Article 4(2) TEU of the Treaty of Lisbon, but relied on the reasoning 
expressed in its 2006 judgment, indicating that there was no substantial 
change between the Maastricht, Amsterdam and Lisbon positions.
On balance, national identity claims had limited success in the pre-
Lisbon era. On the one hand, Member States were successful in what can 
be called implied margin of discretion cases, where the ECJ refused to 
rule on national value choices on jurisdictional grounds. However, on the 
substantive count, justification on the grounds of national identity was 
argued a number of times in order to justify restriction of market free-
doms but with limited success. When it comes to substantive conflicts, 
the ECJ treated national identity as a general justification and balanced 
it against market freedoms or other values of EU law.
4. National identity and the Treaty of Lisbon
As I have already mentioned in the introduction, the national iden-
tity provision was first introduced as part of Article I-5 of the Constitutio-
nal Treaty and was subsequently transposed into Article 4(2) of the TEU.
While the first Treaty defined the concept only in vague terms, Ar-
ticle I-5 of the Constitutional Treaty and the subsequent Article 4(2) TEU 
65 Rottman (n 15) para 41. However the ECJ deferred the proportionality test to the national 
court.
66 Cases C-47/08, C-50/08, C-51/08, C-53/08, C-54/08, C-61/08 and C-52/08 Commi-
ssion v Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Austria, Germany, Greece and Portugal, not yet repor-
ted.
67 Commission v Luxembourg (n 61) para 72.
68 Commission v Luxembourg (n 61) para 124.
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added some clarity to the concept, defining it as national ‘fundamental 
structures, political and constitutional’. Looking into the legislative hi-
story of the European Convention that originally framed the text of what 
has today become Article 4(2) TEU, Working Group V ‘Complementary 
Competences’, in its final report to the European Convention,69 emphasi-
sed that ‘the provision was not a derogation clause’ and that ‘the Member 
States will remain under a duty to respect the provisions of the Treaties.’ 
Instead, the Working Group explained that the purpose of the provision 
is ‘that the Union, in the exercise of its competence, is under an obli-
gation to respect the national identities of the Member States’, which is 
subject to the interpretation of the ECJ, which is the ‘ultimate interpre-
ter of the provision if the political institutions went beyond a reasonable 
margin of appreciation.’70
In addition, the newly phrased Article 4(3) TEU has introduced a 
more balanced approach to the duty of loyal co-operation. According to 
the new wording, pursuant ‘to the principle of sincere cooperation, the 
Union and the Member States shall, in full mutual respect, assist each 
other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties’.
This is not quite the same as the former Article 10 TEC, according 
to which the addressees of the duty of loyal co-operation were only the 
Member States. A long line of cases based on Article 10 TEC fashioned 
the provision so as to create concrete obligations on the part of Member 
States, such as the obligation of EU-friendly interpretation71 or the obli-
gation to make good damages for breach of EU law.72 Now, for the first 
time, the duty of co-operation has become reciprocal, that is, binding on 
the EU and on the Member States at the same time.
Reading paragraphs (2) and (3) of Article 4 TEU together, two questi-
ons arise. First, to what extent can these provisions, taken together, be 
interpreted as creating an enforceable obligation for the EU to interpret 
national law while taking into account national identity? Second, to what 
extent do they authorise the Member States to derogate from EU law on 
the grounds of national identity?
4.1 European Court of Justice
There are two recent cases referring to national identity which were 
decided after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon: Sayn Wittgen-
69 CONV 375/02 REV1 WG V 14, Brussels, 4 November 2002.
70 CONV 375/02 REV1 WG V 14 (n 69) 11.
71 Case 14/83 Sabine von Colson and Elisabeth Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1984] 
ECR 1891.
72 Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Andrea Francovich and Danila Bonifaci and others v 
Italian Republic [1991] ECR I-5357.
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stein, decided on 22 December 2010,73 and Runevič-Vardyn, decided on 
12 May 2011.74 In both cases, the situation involved a tension between 
national constitutional identity on the one hand and freedom of move-
ment under Article 21 TFEU and the right to privacy75 on the other.
Sayn-Wittgenstein concerned an Austrian-born, German-adopted 
woman with Austrian citizenship, claiming the right to have her title 
(Fürstin von Sayn-Wittgenstein), acquired from her adoptive father, en-
tered into the Austrian register of civil status. It was claimed that, as she 
was an estate agent, the impossibility of using the title of Fürstin would 
impair her freedom to provide services.
According to the Austrian government, allowing registration of a 
noble title would be incompatible ‘with the fundamental values of the 
Austrian legal order, in particular with the principle of equal treatment 
enshrined in Article 7 of the Federal Constitutional Law and implemented 
by the Law on the abolition of the nobility.’76
While the ECJ recognised that national identity may be taken into 
consideration in a proportionality analysis, it clarified that reliance on na-
tional identity should be treated as a public policy justification77 that, in 
accordance with earlier case law,78 has to be interpreted strictly as a ‘ge-
nuine and sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of society.’79 
In addition, the ECJ allowed a margin of discretion, in accordance 
with paragraph 31 of its reasoning in Omega. Finally, in paragraph 93, 
the ECJ performed the balancing test itself and concluded that Austria 
acted proportionately in pursuance of a legitimate constitutional aim. 
The ECJ paid attention to the right to privacy under the Charter and the 
Convention, but the issue was not discussed further.
Runevič-Vardyn concerned the case of a woman who wanted to have 
the spelling of her family name amended in her birth and marriage certifi-
cates with letters not existing in the Lithuanian alphabet.80 The ECJ first 
73 Case C-208/09 Ilonka Sayn-Wittgenstein v Landeshauptmann von Wien, not yet repor-
ted.
74 Case C-391/09 Malgožata Runevič-Vardyn and Łukasz Paweł Wardyn v Vilniaus miesto 
savivaldybės administracija and Others, not yet reported.
75 As guaranteed by Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (hereinaf-
ter the Charter) and by Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter the Convention).
76 Sayn-Wittgenstein (n 73) para 76.
77 Sayn-Wittgenstein (n 73) paras 83-84.
78 Omega (n 36) para 30; Case C-33/07 Jipa [2008] ECR I-5157, para 23.
79 Sayn-Wittgenstein (n 73) para 86.
80 It follows from paragraph 22 of the judgment that the name ‘Malgožata Runevič’ was to 
be changed to ‘Małgorzata Runiewicz’, and on the marriage certificate from ‘Malgožata Ru-
nevič-Vardyn’ to ‘Małgorzata Runiewicz-Wardyn’.
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emphasised in paragraph 66 that a ‘person’s forename and surname are 
a constituent element of his identity and of his private life’, protected both 
under the Charter and the Convention, and continued by finding that the 
free movement guarantee under Article 21 TFEU applied to the case.
However, protection of a State’s national language, as a part of nati-
onal identity protected by Article 4(2) TEU, is a value that the European 
Union must respect (paragraph 86). Accordingly, national identity had to 
be balanced with both free movement and the right to private life.
With regard to the first point, the tension between the Article 21 
TFEU free movement guarantee and Article 4(2) TEU national identity 
provision, the ECJ followed the Sayn-Wittgenstein argumentation. If it 
is within the scope of Article 21, a national restriction on the freedom of 
movement can be justified only subject to a proportionality test. However, 
unlike in Sayn-Wittgenstein, where the ECJ performed the balancing itse-
lf, in Runevič-Vardyn the proportionality test was deferred to the national 
court.81
With regard to the second point, the ECJ ruled on the relationship 
between individual rights and national identity. Again, it is upon the na-
tional court to establish whether the national rule leading to the refusal 
of amending a personal name in a person’s relevant documents ‘causes 
serious inconvenience to them and/or their family, at administrative, 
professional and private levels’. Accordingly, the national court will have 
to decide whether a fair balance between the interests at issue has been 
struck.82
As can be seen, in both cases, which now appear to be settled case 
law, the national identity guarantee was interpreted narrowly but remai-
ned an element of the balancing analysis. The question remains why, in 
the former case, the balancing was performed by the ECJ, while it was 
left to a national court in the latter. One of the obvious reasons lies in the 
fact that a republican form of government is not a negotiable issue and it 
would not be reasonable to expect from the national court to set it aside 
on account of freedom of movement. On the other hand, while language 
does indeed represent an element of national identity, it is not unthinkable 
for a national court to allow for exceptions in the case of personal names. 
81 Runevič-Vardyn (n 74) para 83: ‘In the event that the national court finds that the refusal 
to amend the joint surname of the applicants in the main proceedings constitutes a restric-
tion of Article 21 TFEU, it should be noted that, according to settled case-law, a restriction 
on the freedom of movement of persons can be justified only where it is based on objective 
considerations and is proportionate to the legitimate objective of the national provisions 
(see, inter alia, Grunkin and Paul, paragraph 29, and Sayn-Wittgenstein, paragraph 81).’ 
However, in civil law tradition, it is questionable to what extent a national court will be 
prepared to interpret black-letter law.
82 Runevič-Vardyn (n 74) para 91. 
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However, when it came to the assessment of a fundamental right against 
national constitutional identity, the ECJ deferred to the national court.
What appears to have come out of the two mentioned cases is that 
the ECJ will either recognise national constitutional identity itself or de-
fer the final judgment to a national court. 
While in preliminary reference cases the ECJ has a choice either to 
balance national identity and an EU freedom itself or to defer to a nati-
onal court, in infraction proceedings there is no such choice. Deference 
in infraction proceedings would entail leaving the final judgment to na-
tional legislative authorities and solving the case in favour of a Member 
State. However, as we have seen from cases involving Luxembourg official 
authorities,83 the ECJ has preferred to do the job on the grounds of it 
being the least restrictive alternative.84 In both cases, just as in Sayn-
Wittgenstein and Runevič-Vardyn, national identity was understood as a 
legitimate aim which, as an exception to the freedom of movement, had to 
be interpreted restrictively and subject to a proportionality test.
 In addition, it has to be recognised that both the pre-Lisbon Luxem-
bourg cases discussed above dealt with the exercise of official authority, 
an area of law in which the ECJ insists on a uniform approach. Being an 
exception from market freedoms, the official authority exception not only 
has to be interpreted narrowly, but also has to be given ‘uniform interpre-
tation and application throughout the Community and cannot therefore 
be left entirely to the discretion of the Member States.’85 
It would appear that the approach of the ECJ has not changed and 
still relies on a narrow interpretation of official authority, even in the face 
of national identity arguments. Preliminary reference cases dealing with 
the concept of official authority also follow this pattern.86 Such a position 
would appear to confirm Besselink’s claim that constitutional identity, 
though inherently national, is in fact a concept of EU law.87 In other 
words, Article 4(2) TEU has made the discourse about the relationship 
between EU law and national constitutional law a part of EU constituti-
onal law. While it is easy to agree with Von Bogdandy and Schill that ‘[t]
here is now a common European discourse on this most sensitive issue’,88 
83 Commission v Luxembourg (n 61) and Commission v Luxembourg (n 66).
84 Commission v Luxembourg (n 61) para 35; Commission v Luxembourg (n 66) para 124.
85 Case C-405/01 Colegio de Oficiales de la Marina Mercante Española [2003] ECR I-10391, 
para 38. See also Case 152/73 Giovanni Maria Sotgiu v Deutsche Bundespost [1974] ECR 
153, para 5; Case 149/79 Commission v Belgium [1980] ECR 3881, paras 12 and 18.
86 For recent practice, see eg Joined Cases C- C-372/09 and C-373/09 Josep Peñarroja 
Fa (17 March 2011), not yet reported. For earlier case law see, eg Case C-42/92 Adrianus 
Thijssen v Controledienst voor de verzekeringen [1993] ECR I-4047.
87 Besselink (n 51) 37.
88 Von Bogdandy and Schill (n 2) 1441.
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it is still less clear who, if anyone, has the final say. Or to put it in Paul 
Feyerabend’s terms, the unresolved and possibly unresolvable puzzle lies 
in the fact that the common European constitutional discourse does not 
take place in the form of a guided exchange.89
Admittedly, the ECJ has no jurisdiction to interpret national law, 
even less so national constitutional law.90 On the other hand, national 
constitutional courts do not have jurisdiction to interpret Article 4(2) TEU. 
Besselink suggests a solution according to which national constitutio-
nal courts would first determine the substance of national constitutional 
identity, while the ECJ would determine the meaning of the relevant EU 
law. Indeed, national identity is primarily91 constructed at the national 
level, not only as a matter of law but also as a matter of common sense.92 
This does not make national identity absolute. If this were the case, 
application of the Article 4(2) TEU guarantee could be triggered by a mere 
claim that a certain value represents a part of national identity, in which 
case the ECJ would have to exercise self-restraint. In other words, it wo-
uld provide for the immunity of national law from the application of EU 
law, which is obviously not the case.
There are only a few hints so far that the ECJ is prepared to defer to 
national authorities. Most recently, this was the case in Runevič-Vardyn, 
where the ECJ left it to the national court to balance individual rights 
against national constitutional identity. An earlier example can be found 
in UGT-Rioja, which was discussed above.93
89 According to Feyerabend, guided exchange is a form of communication in which ‘some 
or all participants adopt a well specified tradition and accept only those responses that 
correspond to its standards.’ P Feyerabend, Science in a Free Society (NLB 1978) 29.
90 Feyerabend (n 89) 44.
91 Iris Marion Young has demonstrated how a dominant culture can impose its identity on 
minority social groups, thus creating a phenomenon of double identity. See IM Young, Ju-
stice and Politics of Difference (Princeton University Press 2011). Therefore it does not seem 
unthinkable that national identity can be constructed by external actors.
92 For the same argument, see C-53/04 Cristiano Marrosu and Gianluca Sardino v Azienda 
Ospedaliera Ospedale San Martino di Genova e Cliniche Universitarie Convenzionate [2006] 
ECR I-7213, Opinion of AG Maduro, para 40: ‘Doubtless the national authorities, in par-
ticular the constitutional courts, should be given the responsibility to define the nature of 
the specific national features that could justify such a difference in treatment. Those aut-
horities are best placed to define the constitutional identity of the Member States which the 
European Union has undertaken to respect.’ The ECJ, however, ignored the argument.
93 UGT-Rioja (n 57) para 144: ‘It is for the national court, which alone has jurisdiction to 
identify the national law applicable and to interpret it, as well as to apply Community law 
to the cases before it, to determine whether the Historical Territories and the Autonomo-
us Community of the Basque Country have such autonomy, which, if so, would have the 
result that the laws adopted within the limits of the areas of competence granted to those 
infra-State bodies by the Constitution and the other provisions of Spanish law are not of a 
selective nature within the meaning of the concept of State aid as referred to in Article 87(1) 
EC.’
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This may be a signal indicating the approach of the ECJ in future 
cases. Namely, apart from national identity cases, the ECJ is in the habit 
of leaving it to national courts to establish the relevant facts and balance 
their finding with a relevant national regulatory interest. An example of 
such practice is well illustrated by Familiapress,94 where freedom of the 
press and press diversity stood in the way of the application of national 
and EU competition rules. Therefore, Runevič-Vardyn looks rather like a 
continuance of earlier practice than a venture into a new one. 
4.2 National developments
As can be seen, the ECJ firmly defends the position that the national 
identity guarantee under Article 4(2) TEU may not preclude the appli-
cation of EU law, even in cases of conflict with national constitutional 
rules. If national identity does prevail, it prevails only because the ECJ 
has forged the balance in such a way. The same rule, (according to which 
States may not invoke their constitutional rules in order to justify their 
failure to comply with a treaty) which is based on the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties, holds in infraction proceedings95 and preliminary 
reference cases. 
Yet, constitutional identity has become a beloved theme in the legal 
orders of certain Member States. Interestingly, the battlefield on which 
the supremacy of EU law over national constitutional rules was challen-
ged took place not on substantive, but on procedural grounds. In this 
way, the dilemma has been transformed from the question of which rule 
prevails to that of who decides, or even better, who decides last. 
It is probably too simple to ascribe a revival of national constitutio-
nal identity awareness to the new wording of the national identity clause 
in Article I-5 of the Constitutional Treaty and the subsequent entry into 
force of the Treaty of Lisbon. In fact, the involvement of France, which has 
recently elevated the national identity idea to the status of a constitutio-
nal principle, was modest at the time when the provision was discussed 
within the European Convention. As can be seen from the documents of 
the Secretariat of the European Convention,96 the proposed amendments 
to the then definition of national identity included that ‘national identity 
94 Case C-368/95 Vereinigte Familiapress Zeitungsverlags- und vertriebs GmbH v Heinrich 
Bauer Verlag [1997] ECR I-03689.
95For a good example of how a national constitution may not justify non-implementation 
of a directive, see Case C-323/97 Commission v Belgium [1998] ECR I-4281, para 8: The 
Court has consistently held that a Member State may not plead provisions, practices or cir-
cumstances existing in its internal legal system in order to justify a failure to comply with 
the obligations and time-limits laid down in a directive (see, in particular, Case C-107/96 
Commission v Spain [1997] ECR I-3193, para 10).’
96 Reactions to draft Articles 1 to 16 of the Constitutional Treaty – Analysis, CONV 
574/1/03 REV 1, Brussels 26 February 2003 (04.03).
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comprises, as appropriate, the Constitutional “structures”/organisation of 
public authorities at local and regional level/selection of languages/local 
autonomy/status of churches.’ However, French input was negligible.97
Michel Troper suggests that French constitutional doctrine was di-
rectly triggered by the concept of constitutional identity, as introduced by 
the Constitutional Treaty and later on embraced by the Treaty of Lisbon.98 
It would appear that the French constitutional reform of 1 March 2010 
was motivated by an intention to insulate the French constitution against 
European law having the last say.99 Again, Troper puts it succinctly. Since 
EU law prevails over national constitutional law, ‘a French court wishing to 
avoid acknowledging the supremacy of European law must use another ar-
gument than the fact that some principle of French law is a constitutional 
norm. This is where “constitutional identity” comes into play.’100
The doctrine was also embraced by the Conseil Constitutionnel, which 
in 2006 adopted a position according to which ‘transposition of a directive 
may not run counter to a rule or principle inherent to the constitutional 
identity of France, except when the constituting power consents thereto.’101
In order to avoid repeating the emerging literature on the point,102 
suffice it to say that the main effects of the French constitutional reform 
97 According to the Summary provided by the Secretariat, the amendments were introduced 
by ‘Mr Michel + 5 Belgian members of the Convention + observers + Lopes + Hübner + Einem + 
Kiljunen + Vanhanen + Cushnahan + Olesky + Tiilikainen + Peltomäki + Costa + 3 Portuguese 
+ Santer + 2 Luxembourgers + Lequiller + Frendo + Bonde + 8 members of the Convention + 
Wittbrodt + Fogler + Brok + 12 EPP members of the Convention + Katiforis + Serracino-Inglott 
(+ Inguanez) + Chabert (observer) + 5 members of the Convention (observers)’.
98 M Troper, ‘Sovereignty and Lai ̈cité’, 30 Cardozo L Rev 6 (2009) 2561, 2573. This is also 
confirmed by Josso, who writes that before the Constitutional Council’s decision, there were 
no other statements of any specific elements of national constitutional identity; S Josso, 
‘Le caractère social de la République, principe inhérent à l’identité constitutionnelle de la 
France’, report to the Paris Congress of Association française de droit constitutionnel, 5. 
See <http://www.droitconstitutionnel.org/congresParis/comC1/JossoTXT.pdf> accessed 
14 August 2011.
99 See B Kostadinov, ‘Prethodna pitanja ustavnosti u nacionalno pravu i pravo EU’ in T Ća-
peta, I Goldner Lang and S Rodin (eds), Prethodni postupak u pravu Europske unije (Narodne 
novine 2011). Kostadinov refers to V Bernaud and M Fatin-Rouge Stéfanini, ‘La réforme du 
contrôle de constitutionnalité une nouvelle fois en question? Réflexion autour des articles 
61-1 et 62 de la Constitution proposé par le comité Balladur’, Revue francaise de Droit 
constitutionel, no hors-série (2008) 190.
100 Troper (n 98) 2572.
101 Constitutional Council decision no 2006-540DC, July 27, 2006, JO ‘[L]a transposition 
d’une directive ne saurait aller à l’encontre d’une règle ou d’un principe inhérent à l’identité 
constitutionnelle de la France, sauf à ce que le constituant y ait consenti.’ In such a case, it 
would be the national law implementing the directive that would be held unconstitutional.
102 See F Fabbrini, ‘Kelsen in Paris: France’s Constitutional Reform and the Introduction 
of A Posteriori Constitutional Review of Legislation’, German Law Journal, vol 09 no 10 
(2008) 1297; S Rodin, ‘Back to Square One: The Past, the Present and the Future of the 
Simmenthal Mandate’,in Beneyto and Pernice (eds) Constitutional Challenges in the Light of 
the Recent Case Law of National Constitutional Courts (Nomos 2011).
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and, in particular, the newly established abstract constitutional review 
and ‘priority preliminary reference’ to the Constitutional Council, run 
against the well-established supremacy law of the ECJ. First, if a law is 
declared unconstitutional by the Conseil Constitutionnel as being con-
trary to EU law, the power of an ordinary court judge to disapply it is 
pre-empted. Second, an ordinary judge is instructed not to address a 
preliminary reference to the EJC before the Conseil Constitutionnel has 
spoken on the matter.
The answer of the ECJ came in Melki and Abdeli,103 and not surpri-
singly follows the existing case law. The ECJ took the effort to explain 
in great detail what requirements a national interlocutory constitutional 
review has to meet in order to be compatible with EU law. As the ECJ cla-
rified in paragraph 57 of the judgment, Article 267 TFEU precludes natio-
nal legislation establishing an interlocutory constitutional review, insofar 
as the procedure prevents ‘all the other national courts or tribunals from 
exercising their right or fulfilling their obligation to refer questions to the 
Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling.’
In this way, the ECJ maintained the judicial dialogue with ordinary 
courts, and rendered the legal opinions of the Conseil Constitutionnel 
adopted in interlocutory constitutional review procedures irrelevant from 
the perspective of the supremacy of EU law.104
The main problem of the French approach to constitutional identity 
is that it sweeps too broadly and fails to provide for its protected core.
Germany has a long record of dialogue with the ECJ. The German 
Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) triggered the evolution of the pro-
tection of fundamental rights in the EU by insisting on standards of pro-
tection substantially comparable to those under the Basic Law.
However, so far, the BVerfG has never addressed a preliminary refe-
rence to the ECJ. Instead, its influence has always been exerted through 
its position as the ‘court of last say’ in the European judicial dialogue. 
Namely, even after the ECJ has spoken on a matter of EU law, the BVerfG 
is still in a position to pass judgment on issues of national constitutional 
law, and in that way protect national constitutional identity.
 
103 Joined Cases C-188/10 and C-189/10, Aziz Melki and Sélim Abdeli (n 37). For a more 
detailed discussion see Rodin (n 102).
104 It should be noted that the judgment in Melki and Abdeli, similar to the judgment in 
Elchinov, supports the Rheinmühlen case law, according to which a referring court is not 
bound by the legal interpretation of the national appelate court. This is an important proce-
dural element of the supremacy of EU law. See 146/73 Rheinmühlen-Düsseldorf [1974] ECR 
139. The same follows from C-210/06 Cartesio Oktató és Szolgáltató bt [2008] ECR I-09641, 
paras 93-98.
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In 1992, in its decision in the Maastricht case,105 the BVerfG resorted 
to two powerful devices: the essential contents guarantee, under which 
the BVerfG acts as guardian of the core of fundamental rights under 
Article 19(2), which are also protected by the constitutional eternity cla-
use under Article 79(3) of the Basic Law, and the ultra vires doctrine, 
according to which it can review and refuse to apply acts of the Union 
which exceed the transferred powers.106 According to the BVerfG in Li-
sbon (inferring from the Maastricht judgment), constitutional identity is 
guaranteed by Article 79(3) of the Basic Law, and ‘the constituent power 
has not granted the representatives and bodies of the people a mandate 
to dispose of the identity of the constitution.’ 107 As the BVerfG clarified:
The obligation under European law to respect the constituent power 
of the Member States as the masters of the Treaties corresponds to 
the non-transferable identity of the constitution (Article 79.3 of the 
Basic Law), which is not open to integration in this respect. Within the 
boundaries of its competences, the Federal Constitutional Court must 
review, where necessary, whether these principles are adhered to.108
Accordingly, any act of the Union which would impinge on natio-
nal constitutional identity would be ultra vires and thus inapplicable in 
Germany,109 and it is for the BVerfG to refuse to apply it.110
In July 2010, the BVerfG significantly narrowed the ultra vires doctri-
ne in the Honeywell judgment,111 where it held that before an act of the 
EU can be scrutinised on ultra vires grounds, the ECJ should be given an 
opportunity to rule on the matter, either in an annulment action or as a 
matter of preliminary reference. When it comes to a constitutional review, 
the BVerfG can declare an act of the EU ultra vires. However:
the act of the authority of the European Union must be manifestly 
in violation of competences and … the impugned act is highly signi-
ficant in the structure of competences between the Member States 
and the Union with regard to the principle of conferral and to the 
binding nature of the statute under the rule of law.112
105 BVerfGE 89, 155.
106 The BVerfG applied this doctrine in BVerfGE 58, 1 (30-31); 75, 223 (235, 242); 89, 155 
(188), and notably in the Lisbon judgment, BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 of 30.6.2009. See M Mahl-
mann, ‘The Politics of Constitutional Identity and its Legal Frame: The Ultra Vires Decision 
of the German Federal Constitutional Court’, 12 German LJ, 11 (2010) 1407.
107 Lisbon (n 106) para 218.
108 Lisbon (n 106) para 235.
109 Lisbon (n 106) para 241.
110 Lisbon (n 106) para 240.
111 BVerfG, 2 BvR 2661/06 of 6.7.2010. See C Möllers, ‘Constitutional Ultra Vires Review 
of European Acts only under Exceptional Circumstances; Decision of 6 July 2010, 2 BvR 
2661/06, Honeywell’, 7 Eur Const L Rev (2011) 161.
112 Honeywell (n 111) paras 60 and 61.
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While the BVerfG has never addressed a preliminary reference to the 
ECJ, paragraph 60 of the Honeywell decision indicates that it is prepared 
to do so. No less importantly, a national court is under a constitutional 
obligation to refer to the ECJ, and failure to do so may lead to a violation 
of the constitutional right to a lawful judge under Article 101(1) of the 
Basic Law.113
In short, the BVerfG has linked German constitutional identity to 
the eternal and entrenched status of fundamental rights and the core 
of their protection under Article 79(3) of the Constitution. By doing so, 
it has ensured it has the last say in cases involving fundamental rights 
but, at the same time, it has allowed enough space for the ECJ to rule 
on the interpretation and validity of EU law. Importantly, the BVerfG has 
wrapped its doctrine in the principle of sincere co-operation under Article 
4(3) TEU and maintained its doctrine of co-operation between the two 
courts and also a doctrine of friendliness to EU law.114 Being fully aware 
of the ECJ’s position, according to which national identity can justify a 
departure from market freedoms only if it cannot be safeguarded in any 
other way,115 the BVerfG has reserved its position as protector of natio-
nal constitutional identity for situations in which fundamental political 
structures ‘cannot be safeguarded in any other way’.116
5. Conclusion
The identities of the Member States are older than the Founding 
Treaties and exist separate from and regardless of EU law. Moreover, just 
as individual or group identities continue to exist in different settings of 
governance, the national identities of the Member States will continue to 
exist regardless of what form or substance the EU takes in the future. In 
this sense, Article 4(2) TEU reiterates the truism that national identities 
do exist. Having said that, it begs an answer to the question of what the 
legal consequence is of such a recognised existence of national identities. 
The Treaty of Lisbon has not significantly affected the national iden-
tity jurisprudence of the ECJ. Even before its entry into force on 1 De-
cember 2009, the ECJ had developed a main interpretative strategy how 
to address Member States’ constitutional claims. As I have demonstrated 
above, the pre-Lisbon case law can be grouped into three evolutionary 
phases. As a result, the ECJ developed its doctrine of margin of discre-
tion, implied and explicit, and made it clear that national identity cannot 
be absolute. The ECJ also made a distinction between claims that can be 
113 Honeywell (n 111) paras 88-90.
114 Lisbon (n 106) para 240.
115 Commission v Luxembourg (n 61) para 35; Commission v Luxembourg (n 66) para 124.
116 Lisbon (n 106) para 240.
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called national identity small, which are treated like ordinary public pol-
icy justification, and claims which can be called national identity large, 
which trigger some kind of deference to national judicial or regulatory 
authorities. Accordingly, a viable national identity claim makes a regula-
tory aim legitimate per se, which in national identity small cases results 
in the application of the least restrictive alternative test, and in national 
identity large cases leads to deference.
The Treaty of Lisbon has added more clarity to the concept of na-
tional identity. As far as the Treaties are concerned, the Treaty of Lisbon 
was the first one to make clear that national identity refers to national 
constitutional and political structures. In a way, Lisbon accommodated 
national claims to the Vienna Convention rule that States may not claim 
an internal law in order to justify a violation of a treaty.
The situation is quite different if a treaty itself allows some discre-
tion to the States, and this is exactly what Article 4(2) TEU did. However, 
the question remains: what counts as a viable national identity claim? Is 
national constitutional identity, as Besselink puts it, a concept of EU law, 
or is there a plurality of national concepts which have to be respected 
as a matter of law? A plausible first-hand answer would be that a viable 
national constitutional identity claim has to rely on an entrenched con-
stitutional rule, value or fundamental choice. It must not be a mere policy 
choice, or grant of jurisdiction to local authorities, but has to be essential 
for the recognition of a national constitutional order, and differentiated 
from other constitutional orders.
The post-Lisbon era has brought about developments at both the 
European and national level. While the Treaty has not significantly af-
fected the approach of the ECJ described above, France and Germany 
have started to increasingly rely on constitutional identity, challenging 
the claim that it is an exclusive concept of EU law.
In national identity small cases, the ECJ has maintained its public 
policy approach, combined with the least restrictive alternative test. Un-
der this approach, national identity cannot justify restriction of market 
freedoms if there is an alternative, less restrictive, way to protect natio-
nal identity. This is well illustrated by the Commission v Luxembourg ca-
ses, which although decided in different stages of European integration, 
follow the same pattern of analysis.
The situation is different in national identity large cases, where the 
ECJ has shown a readiness either to recognise a national identity claim 
out of hand (Sayn-Wittgenstein) or defer to the national court (Runevič-
Vardyn). What qualified the two last mentioned cases as national identity 
large cases? In the first case, it appeared to be a fundamental constituti-
onal choice of a republican form of government. In the latter case, it was 
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the recognition of the ECJ that a national court is better equipped to do 
the balancing test in a sensitive language case. This approach, however, 
is not prompted by the Lisbon Treaty, but follows the same line of reaso-
ning and deference which the ECJ adopted in UGT-Rioja back in 2008.117 
Arguably, as early as 2008, the same provision was already present in 
the aborted Constitutional Treaty and was an anticipated part of the in-
coming Treaty of Lisbon. However, it remains unclear whether deference 
to the national court is motivated by the wish to defer a value choice or 
by a more practical reason, that is, to allow a national court to establish 
the relevant facts, as the ECJ did, for example, in Familiapress.
Another tendency that can be seen in cases decided by the ECJ is 
that it will be less ready to concede a national identity claim in cases 
where there is a well-established interpretation and a need for uniform 
interpretation of EU law.118
More substantive developments have taken place on the side of the 
Member States, notably in France and Germany. France implemented 
a constitutional reform that resulted in a Kelsen-like system of inter-
locutory constitutional review. The new mechanism was introduced in 
an attempt to give the Conseil Constitutionnel a voice at the European 
level and possibly pre-empt conflicts between French and EU law before 
they reached the ECJ in the form of a preliminary reference. However, by 
focusing on a procedural instrument of interlocutory constitutional re-
view, the newly introduced system not only set a collision course with the 
well-established preliminary reference case law of the ECJ,119 but also fell 
short of defining the substantive core of a French constitutional identity 
that could serve as a countervailing force in Article 4(2) TEU cases.
The German approach appears to be more sober. It is based on the 
principle of co-operation and a clearly defined constitutional identity 
core. The relationship with EU law is understood as one of co-operation, 
and the role of the BVerfG is a complementary and subsidiary one. Natio-
nal constitutional identity is asserted, but dormant, allowing the BVerfG 
the final say in critical cases, but not interfering in national identity small 
situations.
Article 4(2) TEU has arguably created the potential for a new balan-
ce between national identity and market freedoms, and Article 4(3) TEU 
has re-defined the duty of loyal (or sincere) co-operation. Under the new 
provision, the obligation of sincere co-operation has become reciprocal, 
117 UGT-Rioja (n 57).
118 Colegio de Oficiales de la Marina Mercante Española Supra (n 85), and the case law cited 
therein.
119 Rheinmühlen-Düsseldorf (n 104); more recently, see Cartesio Oktató és Szolgáltató bt (n 
104) paras 93-98.
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and it is for the Union and Member States to assist each other in the per-
formance of the Treaties.
In the context of Article 4(2) TEU, this can mean that Member States 
are at liberty to define the core of national constitutional identity, while 
the ECJ retains the power to interpret the broader normative framework 
within which national identity operates in the EU. Too extensive an in-
terpretation of the national identity clause has the potential to block or 
even reverse the course of European integration. On the other hand, too 
narrow an interpretation would render Article 4(2) devoid of its useful 
effect.
The role of Article 4(2) TEU is twofold. As a competence rule, it impo-
ses limits on EU regulation, even in cases where such regulation would 
otherwise be permissible. As an interpretative rule, it provides guidan-
ce for the ECJ and national courts on how to interpret the relationship 
between EU and national law. 
As the law appears to stand today, the Member States are under 
an obligation under Article 2 TEU not to construe national identity in a 
way that is in confrontation with the fundamental rules, principles and 
values of the EU. On the other hand, the ECJ, within the limits of its ju-
risdiction, determines to what extent the Treaties are to be interpreted as 
allowing a margin of discretion in national identity claims, or as treating 
such claims as an ordinary public policy justification. Certainly, national 
constitutional courts retain the right to rule on the application of natio-
nal constitutional law even after the ECJ has spoken, and this can lead 
to a collision between national constitutional and EU law. However, we 
have not witnessed such a development yet.
